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Abstract
We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mech-
anisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately
informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary
transfers are not feasible. We use an equivalence between deterministic, DIC mecha-
nisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained-efficient, op-
timal mechanism for an utilitarian planner. Optimal schemes for other welfare criteria
such as, say, a Rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained.
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1 Introduction
The use of the utilitarian principle as a guide for collective decision making or policy goes
back to the birth of Economics. This principle uses cardinal information about preferences
(and hence about preference intensities) and evaluates social outcomes in terms of the sum
of agents’ expected utilities, or, equivalently, in terms of average individual expected utility.
When monetary transfers are feasible, the maximization of average utility is also a prerequisite
for another classical desideratum, Pareto-efficiency.
In practice, however, many collective decisions are taken through simpler mechanisms
that only extract ordinal information about the ranking of alternatives, and that do not
allow monetary transfers among agents even if these would be feasible (e.g., various voting
schemes within committees and legislatures). The lack of monetary transfers both makes it
impossible to extract refined information about preference intensities, and also weakens the
implications of Pareto efficiency: the set of Pareto efficient allocations can be very large, and
it is not clear how to choose among efficient rules while only using the ordinal information
obtained via voting.
Consider for example a simple situation with two outcomes, a status-quo and a reform,
where voting by majority is known to have many desirable properties (including the provision
of incentives for truthful voting). Should the society use simple majority voting even in a
situation where it is a-priori known that a reform’s proponent stands to gain a moderate
amount if the reform is adopted, while a proponent of the status-quo may lose a lot in that
case? Or should the society adopt the reform only if a sufficiently large majority (i.e., a
qualified- or supermajority) votes in its favor?1 It should be obvious that, in spite of the
fact that any underlying qualified majority mechanism still uses only ordinal information
about preferences and does not allow for monetary transfers, the selective application of such
schemes - preferring the moderate gains from reform only if they accumulate to many agents
- strongly points to an utilitarian reasoning.
The generalization of the above simple idea to settings with more than two alternatives
is the main topic of the present paper: we derive the ex-ante welfare maximizing (e.g.,
utilitarian) mechanisms for settings with an arbitrary number of alternatives fully taking
into account the strategic incentives that agents naturally face in such situations.
While the idea of comparing voting rules in terms of the ex-ante (cardinal) expected
utility they generate is not new, most of the existing literature focused on settings with only
two social alternatives, or, when more alternatives were considered, neglected the fact that
agents may vote strategically (see the Literature Review below).
We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC)2 and deterministic mechanisms
in a social choice setting where agents are privately informed and have single crossing utility
1Such “biased” rules are indeed often used when constitutional amendments are considered, e.g., both the
German and the US constitutions can be changed only if two-thirds of the parliaments’ members are in favor.
2Some authors use the term “strategy proof” mechanisms.
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functions over several alternatives. We assume that monetary transfers are not feasible. This
framework yields a social choice model where the set of DIC mechanisms is not trivial, while
being markedly different from, say, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves schemes that are associated
with the DIC requirement in settings with monetary transfers and quasi-linear utility.
Our analysis uses a characterization result (Saporiti [2009]) for DIC, Pareto efficient and
anonymous mechanisms in frameworks with single-crossing preferences. In turn, Saporiti’s
result builds on a classical “converse” to the Median Voter Theorem due to Moulin [1980].
Roughly speaking, Moulin’s result says that, on the full domain of single-peaked preferences,
all DIC, Pareto efficient and anonymous mechanisms that only depend on the agents’ top
alternatives (or peaks) can be described as schemes that choose the median among the n
“real” peaks of actual voters and an additional n−1 fixed “phantom” voters’ peaks.3 Saporiti
is able to remove Moulin’s assumption that the allowed mechanisms only depend on peaks,
while obtaining a result in the same spirit as Moulin’s which holds for maximal domains of
single-crossing preferences.
Although deterministic, DIC mechanisms are described here by a function of several
continuous variables satisfying complex constraints, the above result implies that the problem
of finding mechanisms maximizing some given social welfare functional (that may depend on
preference intensities!) can be reduced to the simpler problem of finding K non-negative
constants adding up to n− 1, where K is the number of alternatives and n is the number of
agents. These constants represent the number of phantom peaks that need to be placed on
each alternative.
For example, when there are only two alternatives, say a status quo and a reform, locating
m, 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, phantom peaks on the reform and n − 1 − m phantom peaks on the
status-quo yields a choice rule where the reform is implemented if at least n−m real voters
are in its favor. The optimal m in this case, and, more generally, the optimal numbers of
phantom peaks on each of alternative, depend of course on the primitives of the social choice
situation such as the utility functions and the distribution of (real) agents’ types.
Our main result focuses on the utilitarian maximization of social welfare. Under a joint
regularity assumption on utilities and on the distribution of types, we offer simple and in-
tuitive formulae for the optimal number of phantom peaks that need to be placed on each
alternative. The formulae are obtained by observing that shifting phantom peaks among
adjacent alternatives has an effect only in cases where the median peak shifts as well. Opti-
mal schemes for other welfare criteria such as, say, a Rawlsian maximin, or maximax can be
analogously obtained.
We also show that, although the first-best utilitarian rule is not implementable in our
setting, the second-best (constrained efficient) rule obtained here approximates the first-best
if the population is large. In other words, with large populations, the optimal placement
of phantoms is such that the decision is shifted from the alternative preferred by the (true)
3The precise result requires several technical conditions.
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median voter in the direction of the alternative preferred by the average voter.
A very well known application of a social choice framework with single-crossing preferences
is to voting over tax schedules - see for example, Roberts [1977], Romer [1975], and Meltzer
and Richard [1981]. Persson and Tabellini [2000] (Chapter 6) survey this literature and use
such a framework as the starting point to study voting for redistributive programs such as
pensions, unemployment insurance, assistance to the poor, and labor market regulations.
They assume that there are only two parties who each suggests policy platforms. Hence,
although the taxation application can have infinite number of alternatives, it reduces there
to the case of two alternatives. Under simple majority voting, the decisive voter is the one
with the median type. Given that the real income distribution typically has a mean above
median, the government “size” that results from majority voting in this model is too large
compared to the social optimal one. This basic insight is also important in understanding
the difficulty of implementing pension reforms. Our framework may thus be also useful for
the analysis of multi-party elections. As we shall see later, for any number of alternatives,
our optimal mechanism tailors the voting rule to correct the difference between the mean and
the median.
Related Literature
The present analysis combines modeling choices and insights from two important strands of
the literature:
1. On the one hand, the private values model with monetary transfers serves as the
workhorse of a very large body of literature that focuses on trading mechanisms for the
provision of public or private goods. Classical results include, for example, the charac-
terization of utilitarian (value-maximizing) mechanisms due to Vickrey-Clarke-Groves,
and the characterization of revenue-maximizing auctions due to Myerson [1981]. Cardi-
nal preference intensities play a main role in the formulation of both implementability
and optimality results. In addition, monetary transfers are key to controlling the agents’
incentives, and can be finely tuned to match the values obtained from physical alloca-
tions. A main complication in our present framework without transfers (but otherwise
similar to the above) is that implementability puts restrictions on mechanisms that do
not reduce to a simple monotonicity condition.
2. On the other hand, a distinct, very large body of work in the realm of social choice
has focused on the implementation of desirable social choice rules in abstract frame-
works with purely ordinal preferences, and without monetary transfers. Classical re-
sults include the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem (Gibbard [1973] and
Satterthwaite [1975]) and the Median Voter Theorem for settings with single-peaked
preferences (see Black [1948]). When a Pareto-efficient rule, say, is not implementable
in a certain framework, that literature often remains silent about how to choose among
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implementable schemes because preference intensities are not part of the model, and
because other goals are not easily formulated within it. For similar reasons, when
multiple Pareto-efficient rules are implementable, this literature does not offer tools to
meaningfully ranking them.
The idea of comparing voting rules in terms of the ex-ante expected utility they generate
goes back to Rae [1969]. That paper and almost the entire following literature focus on
settings with two social alternatives (a reform and a status quo, say) where a mechanism
can be described by a single function, the probability that the reform is chosen given the
agents’ reports about their types. In this special case, the DIC constraint implies that
deterministic mechanisms are, for any profile of others’ reports, described by a step function
with a unique jump. As a consequence of this simple structure, anonymous and constrained-
efficient mechanisms can be represented by qualified majority rules where the reform is chosen
if at least a certain number of agents votes in its favor. Schmitz and Tro¨ger [2012] identify
qualified majority rules as ex-ante welfare maximizing in the class of DIC mechanisms -
as explained above this can be seen as an implication of our main result.4 Azrieli and Kim
[2011] nicely complement this analysis for two alternatives by showing that any interim Pareto
efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) choice rule must be a qualified majority rule.5
The situation dramatically changes when there are three, or more alternatives: the DIC/BIC
constraints and the mechanisms themselves are much more complex, and not much is known
about them.
Apesteguia, Ballester and Ferrer [2011] consider a general social choice model where agents
derive cardinal utility from several alternatives, and evaluate mechanisms in terms of the ex-
ante expected utility they generate.6 Their analysis completely abstracts from incentives
constraints: strategic voting is not considered - this would lead there to impossibility results-
and the scoring rules that emerge as optimal in their analysis are known to be subject to
strategic manipulation.
Borgers and Postl [2009] study a setting with three alternatives: in their model it is
common knowledge that the top alternative for one agent is the bottom for the other, and
vice-versa. The agents also differ in the relative intensity of their preferences for a middle
alternative (the compromise) when compared to the top and bottom one, respectively. This
intensity is private information. In addition to a characterization of BIC mechanisms in terms
of monotonicity and an envelope condition, Borgers and Postl conduct numerical simulations
and show that the efficiency loss from second-best rules is often small.7
4These authors also perform an analysis for Bayesian mechanisms, which is not covered by our study.
5Again in a setting with two alternatives, Barbera and Jackson [2006] take the qualified majority rule as
given, and derive the optimal weight that maximizes the total expected utilities of all agents.
6They also consider other goals such as maxmin, etc.
7See also McLean and Postlewaite [2002] who study Bayesian incentive compatibility in settings where
monetary transfers are limited.
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In a principal-agent model with quadratic utility functions, hidden information but with-
out transfers, Kovac and Mylovanov [2009] find that the optimal mechanism is deterministic.
Rosar [2012] looks at a setting with a continuum of alternatives, quadratic utilities and in-
terdependent preferences, and compares two particular aggregation mechanisms, the median
and the average, respectively.
Motivated by computer science applications, Hartline and Roughgarden [2008] study how
the system designer can use service degradation (money burning) to align the private users’
interests with the social objective. Chakravarty and Kaplan [2013] and Condorelli [2012] an-
alyze optimal allocation problems in private value environments without monetary transfers.
In their models agents can send costly and socially wasteful signals (these may be payments to
outsiders). In contrast to the above papers, Drexel and Klein [2013] allow the redistribution
of the collected monetary payments among the agents. They confine attention to settings
with two social alternatives and show that a principal who wishes to maximize the agents’
welfare (i.e., welfare from the physical allocation minus potential transfers to outsiders) will
use a mechanism that does not involve any monetary transfers! Hence, their paper offers a
powerful argument for the use of voting schemes. In particular, it must be the case that,
for settings with two alternatives, their optimal mechanism coincides with the one derived in
this paper, where monetary transfers are a-priori ruled out.
A quite different line of study is pursued by Jackson and Sonnenschein [2007] who consider
the linkage of many distinct social problems. Even if no monetary transfers within one
problem are possible, the linkage with other decisions creates the possibility of fine-tuning
incentives, which acts as having some “pseudo-transfers”. Efficiency can be attained then in
the limit, where the number of considered problems grows without bound.
As already mentioned above, the seminal paper in the social choice literature closely re-
lated to the present research is Moulin [1980]. Several authors have extended Moulin’s charac-
terization in terms of median choices and phantom voters within the single-peaked preferences
domain by discarding the assumption that mechanisms can only depend on peaks.8 Excel-
lent examples are Barbera and Jackson [1994], Sprumont [1991], Ching [1997], Schummer
and Vohra [2007], and Chatterjee and Sen [2011].9 Saporiti [2009] extends Moulin’s charac-
terization to the domain of single-crossing preferences. On maximal single-crossing domains
he obtains an equivalence between dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms and
generalized median voter schemes. We will use his equivalence result to characterize optimal
mechanisms.
8See Sprumont [1995] for an excellent survey. Recently, Ehlers, Peters and Storcken [2002] extend Moulin’s
characterization to probabilistic strategy-proof rules, and Nehring and Puppe [2007] extend it to a class of
generalized single-peaked preference domains based on abstract betweenness relations.
9Schummer and Vohra [2002] and Dokow et al. [2012] also establish the equivalence between strategy-proof
rules and generalized median voter schemes. In both models, however, agents’ preferences are quadratic and
thus parameterized solely by their peaks. Hence, they can directly focus on peaks-only mechanisms.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the social choice
model and the design problem. In Section 3 we illustrate the model and some implications
of incentive compatibility in the simple special case where utilities are linear. In particular,
we show that the welfare-maximizing rule (first-best) is not implementable although it is
monotone. In Section 4 we present Saporiti’s result that characterizes anonymous, Pareto-
efficient and DIC mechanisms in terms of median mechanisms among the n real voters and
n− 1 phantom ones. We also show that, in the presence of DIC, Pareto-efficiency, unanimity
and ontoness of the social choice function are all equivalent. In Section 5 we use the above
characterization result to derive precise formulae governing the location of phantom peaks in
the incentive compatible, welfare maximizing mechanism (second-best). We also show that,
when the number of agents goes to infinity, the second best mechanism converges to the first-
best that can be achieved under complete information. Finally, we also discuss extensions
to other welfare criteria. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A. Appendix
B discusses in more detail the regularity conditions used in the characterization of optimal
mechanisms.
2 The Social Choice Model
We consider n agents who have to choose one out of K mutually exclusive alternatives. Let
K = {1, ...,K} denote the set of alternatives. Agent i ∈ {1, ..., n} has (cardinal) utility uk(xi),
where k ∈ K is the chosen alternative and where xi is a parameter (or type) privately known to
agent i only. We assume that for any k, uk(xi) is bounded. The types x1, ..., xn are distributed
on the interval [0, 1]n according to a commonly known, joint cumulative distribution function
Φ with density φ.10
Given any two alternatives k and l with k < l, let xk,l denote the cutoff type that is
indifferent between them:11
ul
(
xk,l
)
= uk
(
xk,l
)
. (1)
To simplify notation, we denote xk ≡ xk−1,k. We assume that utilities are single-crossing
with respect to the order of alternatives 1, ...,K: for any two alternatives k and l with k < l
it holds that {
uk (xi) > ul (xi) if xi < xk,l
uk (xi) < ul (xi) if xi > xk,l
. (2)
We further assume that each alternative is the top alternative for some type of the agents.
That is, for any k ∈ K, there exists xi ∈ [0, 1] such that
uk (xi) > max
l∈K,l 6=k
ul (xi) . (3)
10Here agents’ types can be correlated. In Section 5 we shall assume independence between the agents’
types.
11We assume that for any two alternatives k and l, the indifferent type xk,l is unique.
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Note that we use here the one-dimensional, private values specification – the most common
one in the vast literature on optimal mechanism design with monetary transfers that followed
Myerson’s (1981) seminal contribution. But we assume that monetary transfers are not
feasible in our framework.
The social planner’s general goal is to reach, for any realization of types, a Pareto efficient
allocation. We shall primarily focus on the case of a utilitarian planner whose objective is to
maximize the sum of the agents’ expected utilities
max
k∈K
E
[∑
i
uk (xi)
]
.
Remark 1 The single-crossing property (2), together with assumption (3), implies that the
cutoffs are well-ordered:
0 ≡ x1 < ... < xK < xK+1 ≡ 1. (4)
To see this, we note that, by definition of xk and the single-crossing property (2),
uk (xi) < uk−1 (xi) for all xi < xk.
Similarly, by definition of xk+1 and the single-crossing property (2), we have
uk (xi) < uk+1 (xi) for all xi > xk+1.
If xk ≥ xk+1, any type xi satisfies either xi ≤ xk or xi ≥ xk+1, and thus alternative k
is (weakly) dominated either by alternative k − 1 or by alternative k + 1, which contradicts
(3). Therefore, we must have xk < xk+1 for all k ∈ K, which proves (4). Note that, by
definition of xk and by (4), agents with type xi have k as their top alternative if and only if
xi ∈
[
xk, xk+1
]
.
Remark 2 The underlying domain of ordinal preferences is maximal with respect to single-
crossing, i.e., one cannot add to it another ordinal preference profile without violating the
single crossing property. To see this, note that each cutoff xk,l divides the set of types into
two intervals where ordinal preferences differ with respect to the ordering of alternative k and
l. Since each alternative is top for some types, the interval of types is thus partitioned into
K(K − 1)/2 + 1 parts, each corresponding to a distinct ordinal preference. But this is also
the maximum number of ordinal profiles in a maximal domain of single-crossing preferences
on K alternatives (see Saporiti [2009]).
Remark 3 The agents’ preferences are single-peaked. To see this, consider agent i with type
xi ∈
(
xk, xk+1
)
. By definition of xk, agent i prefers alternative k to any alternative l < k,
and by definition of xk+1, agent i prefers k over any l > k. Now consider two alternatives
l and m with l < m < k. Since xl < xm < xk, we have xi > xl,m and agent i prefers
m to l. Similarly, agent i prefers m to l if k < m < l. Therefore, agent i’s preferences
are single-peaked. On the other hand, our preference domain is a strict subset of the full
single-peaked preference domain: not all single-peaked preferences are compatible with our
environment (see below an explicit illustration in the linear environment).
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We focus on deterministic direct mechanisms where each agent reports his type, and
where, for any profile of reports, the mechanism chooses one alternative from K. Formally,
a deterministic direct mechanism is a function g : [0, 1]n → K = {1, ...,K}. A deterministic
mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) if for any player i and for any
xi, x
′
i and x−i:
ug(xi,x−i) (xi) ≥ ug(x′i,x−i) (xi) . (5)
It is clear from the above definition that two types that have the same ordinal preferences
must be treated in the same way by a DIC mechanism. Thus, an implication of the lack of
monetary transfers is that DIC mechanisms cannot depend on preferences intensities.
3 An Illustration: The Linear Environment
We introduce here the following simple specification with linear utilities - these are necessarily
single crossing. This specification will also be very useful later, when we describe optimal
mechanisms.
Suppose the utilities are linear: uk (xi) = ak + bkxi. We also assume that bk ≥ 0 for all
k ∈ K and bk 6= bl for all l 6= k. Without loss (by renaming alternatives if necessary), we
assume that bK > bK−1 > ... > b1 ≥ 0. The cutoff type who is indifferent between two
adjacent alternatives k and k − 1 is given by
xk ≡ xk−1,k = ak−1 − ak
bk − bk−1 . (6)
These restrictions, together with the definition of xl,k, imply that xl,k ∈ (xl+1, xk) for k > l+1,
because
xl,k =
al − ak
bk − bl =
(al − al+1) + ...+ (ak−1 − ak)
(bl+1 − bl) + ...+ (bk − bk−1) .
Note first that our preference domain is a strict subset of the full single-peaked preference
domain. Indeed, consider a setting with 4 different alternatives (1, 2, 3 and 4), and suppose
that it holds that x1,4 ∈ (x2,3, x3,4), as shown in Figure 1. The feasible single-peaked prefer-
ences that have alternative 2 on their top are 2  1  3  4 and 2  3  1  4. In particular,
the preference 2  3  4  1 is not compatible with the linear environment. Similarly, if
x1,4 ∈ (x1,2, x2,3), the feasible single-peaked preferences that have alternative 3 on their top
are 3  2  4  1 and 3  4  2  1. Here the preference profile 3  2  1  4 is not
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compatible with our structure.
Alternative 4
Alternative 3
Alternative 2
Alternative 1
2,1x 3,2x 4,3x
4,1x
ix
),( ixku
Figure 1: Not all single-peaked preferences are compatible with our linear structure.
Analogously to the classical framework with monetary transfers, a mechanism g (xi, x−i)
is DIC if and only if (i) for all x−i and for all i, g (xi, x−i) is increasing in xi; and (ii) for any
agent i, any xi ∈ [0, 1] and x−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1, the following condition holds:
ug(xi,x−i) (xi) = ug(0,x−i) (0) +
∫ xi
0
bg(z,x−i)dz. (7)
When monetary transfers are feasible, any monotone decision rule g (xi, x−i) is incentive
compatible since it is always possible to augment it with a transfer such that the equality
required by (7) holds. Thus, with transfers, only monotonicity really matters for DIC. In
particular, if monetary transfers were available, the welfare-maximizing allocation would be
implementable via the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. But, without mone-
tary transfers not all monotone decision rules g (xi, x−i) are implementable, and in particular,
the welfare maximizing allocation need not be incentive compatible although it is monotone.
This phenomenon is illustrated in the next example.
Example 1 (First-best Rule Not Implementable) Consider the linear environment with
two alternatives {1, 2} and with two agents {i,−i}. The designer is indifferent between alter-
natives 1 and 2 if
2a1 + b1 (xi + x−i) = 2a2 + b2 (xi + x−i) .
The first-best rule conditions on the value of the average type, and is given by
g (xi, x−i) =
{
1 if 12 (xi + x−i) ∈ [0, x2)
2 if 12 (xi + x−i) ∈ [x2, 1]
where cutoff x2 is defined in (6): x2 ≡ (a1 − a2) / (b2 − b1). The first-best rule is increasing
in both xi and x−i. But, for all x−i ∈ [0, 2x2) and xi ∈ [2x2 − x−i, 1), we can rewrite the
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integral condition (7) as
a2 + b2xi = a1 +
∫ 2x2−x−i
0
b1dz +
∫ xi
2x2−x−i
b2dz = a1 + b1
(
2x2 − x−i
)
+ b2
(
xi − 2x2 + x−i
)
,
which reduces to x−i = x2. Therefore, the integral condition is violated for all x−i 6= x2.
The following taxation example illustrates how the above linear specification can be used
to model important voting applications. The example is taken from Persson and Tabellini
[2000] (Chapter 6, page 118-121), which, in turn, follow Romer [1975], Roberts [1977], and
Meltzer and Richard [1981].
Example 2 Consider a static economy with a large number of agents who differ only in their
productivities. The preferences of agent i are quasi-linear:
ui = ci + v (`i) ,
where ci and `i denote consumption and leisure, respectively. The function v (·) is increasing
and strictly concave. Each individual faces a private budget constraint:
ci ≤ kyi + τ ,
where (1− k) is the (linear) income tax rate, yi the labor supply of agent i, and τ a lump-sum
transfer. The real wage is normalized to one. Each individual also faces an “effective time”
constraint:
yi + `i ≤ 1 + xi,
where xi captures individual productivity for agent i. More productive individuals have a larger
effective time xi. Let’s assume that xi is distributed according to a common distribution F
with mean µ.
Calculating the optimal labor supply, together with redistribution of the raised taxes through
τ , allows us to write the indirect utility function of individual i over k as
uki (xi) = k
(
1 + xi − v−1` (k)
)
+ (1− k) (1 + µ− ξ (k)) + v (v−1` (k)) ,
where v−1` (·) is the inverse function of the marginal utility of leisure. Taking into account
the optimality of labor choice, the marginal utility with respect to k is:
duki (xi)
dk
= xi − µ− (1− k) 1
v``
[
v−1` (k)
] . (8)
It implies that the most preferred tax rate (1− k∗i ) for agent i is
1− k∗i = v``
[
v−1` (k
∗
i )
]
(xi − µ) .
Therefore, an agent with below average income (xi < µ) prefers a positive tax (1− k∗i > 0),
and the preferred tax rate (1− k∗i ) is higher the poor he is. We can translate this formulation
into the linear specification by setting bk = k and
ak = k
(
1− v−1` (k)
)
+ (1− k) (1 + µ− v−1` (k))+ v (v−1` (k)) .
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4 Generalized Median Voter Schemes
In order to study optimal mechanisms, we first need to characterize the set of incentive
compatible mechanisms. An influential paper by Moulin [1980] shows that, if each agent is
restricted to report his top alternative only, then every DIC, Pareto efficient and anonymous
voting scheme on the full domain of single-peaked preferences is equivalent to a generalized
median voter scheme. That is, one can obtain each DIC, efficient and anonymous scheme
by adding (n− 1) fixed ballots (phantoms) to the n voters’ ballots and then choosing the
median of this larger set of ballots. It turns out that Moulin’s characterization also holds in
our setting although agents are not restricted to report only their peaks, and although the
domain of preferences is a strict subset of the full domain of single-peaked preferences. This
result is due to Saporiti [2009]: he provides a characterization of anonymous, unanimous and
DIC mechanisms for maximal domains of single-crossing preferences, in a spirit similar to
Moulin [1980]. We first need several definitions:
Definition 1 (i) A mechanism g is onto if, for every alternative k ∈ K, there exists a type
profile (xi, x−i) ∈ [0, 1]n such that g (xi, x−i) = k.
(ii) A mechanism g is unanimous if xi ∈
(
xk, xk+1
)
for all i implies g (x) = k.
(iii) A mechanism g is Pareto efficient if, for any profile of reports (xi, x−i) ∈ [0, 1]n , there
is no alternative k ∈ K such that ui(xi, k) ≥ ui(xi, g(x)) for all i, with strict inequality
for at least one agent.
(iv) A mechanism g is anonymous if, for any profile of reports (xi, x−i) ∈ [0, 1]n , g (x1, ..., xn) =
g
(
xσ(1), ..., xσ(n)
)
where σ denotes any permutation of the set {1, ..., n}.
Theorem 1 (Saporiti, 2009) An unanimous, anonymous mechanism g is DIC if and only
if there exists (n− 1) numbers α1, ..., αn−1 ∈ K such that for any type profile (x1, ..., xn) ∈
[0, 1]n with xi ∈ (xki , xki+1] for all i, it holds that
g (x1, ..., xn) = M(α1, ..., αn−1, k1, ..., kn),
where the function M(α1, ..., αn−1, k1, ..., kn) returns the median of (α1, ..., αn−1, k1, ..., kn).
It is clear that in our setting a Pareto-efficient mechanism is unanimous and that an
unanimous mechanism is onto. In the presence of the DIC all these requirements are, in fact,
equivalent.
Lemma 1 Every onto and DIC mechanism is Pareto efficient and satisfies unanimity.
Example 3 (Voting with Two Agents) If N = 2 then all DIC, anonymous and unani-
mous mechanisms can be described by median mechanisms with one phantom. For example,
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if K = 3, the social alternatives chosen by all such mechanisms as a function of the agents’
types can be described by the three tables in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: DIC mechanisms with two agents and three alternatives
The left table in Figure 2 corresponds to the case where the added phantom voter has a peak
on k∗ = 3. The middle table corresponds to the case where k∗ = 1, while the right table
corresponds to the case with k∗ = 2.
As illustrated in the above Example, Theorem 1 greatly simplifies the problem of finding
optimal mechanisms. Nevertheless, it should be clear that, with many agents and alternatives,
this remains a rather complex discrete optimization problem since the number of possible
partitions of phantoms’ peaks is quite large.12 In the next section we show how to solve it
under some regularity conditions on the distribution of types and utility functions.
5 Optimal Mechanisms
In this section we characterize socially optimal allocations that respect the incentive con-
straints (constrained efficiency, or “second-best”). Following the mechanism design litera-
ture, we shall primarily focus on the utilitarian welfare criterion: the social planner wants
to maximize the sum of the agents’ expected utilities. As we mentioned previously, for DIC
mechanisms the three properties used above – onto, Pareto efficiency, and unanimity – are
equivalent in our environment. Therefore, we confine attention below to mechanisms that
are anonymous, onto and DIC.
We first characterize the optimal mechanism for single-crossing preferences. We then use
the linear case to further illustrate some of the properties of the optimal mechanism. Finally,
we briefly discuss how to obtain similar characterizations using welfare criteria other than
utilitarian.
5.1 General Characterization
Given the characterization of Theorem 1, the set of anonymous, onto and DIC mechanisms
coincides with the set of generalized median voter schemes with n real voters and (n− 1)
12The number of possible partitions can be calculated from the so called Stirling numbers of the second kind.
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phantom voters. Therefore, the task of searching optimal mechanisms is reduced to that of
finding the optimal position for the peaks of these (n− 1) phantom voters. In order to be
able to offer simple, intuitive formulae for the number of phantom peaks on each alternative
we make below several standard assumptions on the distribution of agents’ signals.
Assumption A The agents’ signals are distributed identically and independently of each
other on the interval [0, 1] according to a cumulative distribution function F with density
f .
This assumption yields the standard symmetric, independent private values model (SIPV)
widely used in the literature on trading mechanisms with transfers. We need another assump-
tion that combines requirements on the utility functions and on the distribution of types.
Before introducing it, we need some notation. Let us define, for all k ≥ 2,
ukx<xk = E
[
uk (x) |x < xk
]
as the expected utility from alternative k, conditional on the agent’s type x being lower than
the cutoff xk. Similarly, we define
ukx>xk = E
[
uk (x) |x > xk
]
as the expected utility from alternative k conditional on the agent’s type x being higher than
the cutoff xk. Finally, let us define the function Γ (k) as
Γ (k) =
uk−1
x<xk
− uk
x<xk
uk
x>xk
− uk−1
x>xk
.
That is, Γ (k) is the ratio of the difference of the “lower” conditional expected utilities for
two adjacent alternatives k− 1 and k over the difference of the “upper” conditional expected
utilities for the same adjacent alternatives. By the definition of cutoff xk and by the single-
crossing property, uk−1
x<xk
> uk
x<xk
and uk
x>xk
> uk−1
x>xk
. Therefore, Γ (k) > 0 for all k ≥ 2. The
function Γ (k) plays an important role in our later analysis.
Assumption B The function Γ is increasing.
In Appendix B we derive an intuitive and concise sufficient condition on the primitives
of the social choice model (utility functions and the distribution of types) for the above
assumption to hold. Define also
γ (k) =
(
uk−1
x<xk
− uk
x<xk
)
(
uk−1
x<xk
− uk
x<xk
)
+
(
uk
x>xk
− uk−1
x>xk
) = 1
1 + 1/Γ (k)
,
and note that, by Assumption B, γ is also increasing.
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Consider now an environment with n voters, and let lk denote the number of phantom
voters with peak on alternative k in a generalized median voter scheme with n− 1 phantom
voters. Our analysis is based on a simple observation: if lk is part of the optimal allocation of
the (n− 1) phantoms and lk > 0, then shifting one phantom voter from alternative k to either
alternative k − 1 or k + 1 weakly reduces the total expected utility.13 For instance, shifting
one phantom voter from alternative k to k − 1 has an impact only if it changes the chosen
alternative. However, the shift will change the chosen alternative only if there are (n − 1)
voters (both “real” and “phantom”) with values below xk, or, in other words, only if there
are exactly
(
n− 1−∑k−1m=1 lm) real voters with values below xk. These kind of arguments
generate the following bounds on the cumulative distribution of phantom voters:
k−1∑
m=1
lm ≥ nγ (k)− 1, for all k ≥ 2, (9)
k∑
m=1
lm ≤ nγ (k + 1) , for all k ≤ K − 1. (10)
Since
∑k
m=1 lm has to be integer, the above two bounds lead to an essentially unique distri-
bution of phantoms.
Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumptions A and B hold, and let dze denote the largest integer
that is below z. The optimal mechanism for n agents is a generalized median scheme with
(n− 1) phantom voters’ peaks distributed according to
l∗k =

dnγ (2)e if k = 1
dnγ (k + 1)e − dnγ (k)e if 1 < k < K
n− 1−∑K−1m=1 l∗m if k = K .
The above theorem reveals that adding or eliminating an alternative has only a local
effect. That is, if we add an alternative k1 such that an interval
[
xk, xk+1
]
is further divided
into
[
xk, xk1
]
and
[
xk1 , xk+1
]
, the only effect on the optimal phantom allocation is that the
original number of phantoms placed on alternatives k and k+1 are split between the original
alternatives k, k+1, and the new alternative k1. Similarly, if we eliminate alternative k, then
the phantoms that were allocated on this alternative are now re-allocated to adjacent alterna-
tives k−1 and k+1, without any effect on the other alternatives. This “locality-effect” follows
from the single-peaked preferences: the social planner does not want to change the chosen
alternative if the peak of the median voter does not change as a result of adding/eliminating
the available alternatives.
The optimal mechanism introduces biases towards different alternatives, through alloca-
tion of phantom voters, that take into account the agents’ utilities from the different alterna-
tives and the distribution of types. The above theorem also implies that, with a large number
of voters, the optimal mechanism places phantom peaks on every alternative.
13This is feasible only if lk > 0. It turns out that the derived bounds (9) and (10) remain valid for alternatives
with zero phantom voters. See Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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Remark 4 What if Assumption B fails? Suppose that Γ (k + 1) < Γ (k), and thus that
γ (k) < γ (k + 1). Then we must have l∗k = 0. To see this, suppose by contradiction that
l∗k > 0. We can apply bounds (9) and (10) to obtain that
l∗k =
k∑
m=1
l∗m −
k−1∑
m=1
l∗m ≤ n [γ (k + 1)− γ (k)] + 1 < 1.
Since lk has to be an integer, we obtain that l∗k = 0, a contradiction.
If there are only two alternatives, Theorem 2 specifies the optimal qualified majority
rule. That is, the optimal decision can also be implemented by voting with a properly
chosen majority rule. Here are two examples: 1) Zero phantoms on one of the alternatives
corresponds to the unanimity rule, and such a rule can be optimal only if the number of
the real voters is relatively small; 2) For n odd, (n − 1)/2 phantoms on each alternative
corresponds to the simple majority rule, and such a rule is optimal in symmetric situations.
More generally, each optimal rule is a qualified majority rule, where the bias in favor of one
alternative depends on the ratio of expected relative losses suffered in each situation by those
whose preferred alternative was not chosen. The following corollary characterizes the optimal
voting rule in the case of two alternatives. Note that Assumption B is not needed for this
result.
Corollary 1 Suppose there are n agents and only two alternatives, K = 2. Under Assump-
tion A, the optimal rule is implemented through a voting game in which alternative 1 is chosen
if and only if at least n− dnγ (2)e voters voted in its favour.
Our next result shows that, when the number of voters is large, the optimal (second-best)
mechanism approximates the welfare maximizing mechanism (first-best) which, as illustrated
in Example 1, is not implementable in our setting. In other words, our optimal mechanism
corrects for the difference in the alternatives preferred by the (real) median voter and the
one yielding the highest average welfare.
While this result is relatively intuitive (since the aggregate uncertainty vanishes in the
limit), the proof is not trivial. It uses the single-crossing and regularity assumption made
above. A result in the same spirit for settings with only two alternatives has been obtained
by Ledyard and Palfrey [2002].
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumptions A and B hold. Let the number of agents n go to
infinity. Then the optimal DIC mechanism (second-best) converges to the optimal mecha-
nism under complete information (first-best). In other words, in the limit, the optimal DIC
mechanism yields the social alternative with the highest expected welfare.
5.2 The Linear Case
We illustrate our characterization of optimal mechanisms in the linear environment set out in
Section 3. For this environment, we introduce a simpler assumption to replace Assumption
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B. Let X be the random variable representing the agents’ type. We first define two functions,
C (x) and c (x), as follows:
C(x) = E[X|X > x] and c(x) = E[X|X ≤ x].
Assumption B’ The functions x− C(x) and x− c(x) are increasing.
In Appendix B we offer sufficient conditions on the distribution of types for Assumption
B’ to hold. These are related to ubiquitous conditions on hazard rates, well-known from the
theory of optimal mechanism design with quasi-linear utility and monetary transfers. In the
linear environment, the function γ (k) becomes
γ (k) =
xk − c (xk)
C (xk)− c (xk) .
Under Assumption B’, the function
C
(
xk
)− c (xk)
xk − c (xk) = 1−
xk − C (xk)
xk − c (xk)
is decreasing in xk. It follows that γ (k) is increasing since
γ (k + 1) =
xk+1 − c (xk+1)
C (xk+1)− c (xk+1) ≥
xk − c (xk)
C (xk)− c (xk) = γ (k) .
Therefore, we obtain the following corollary to Theorem 2.
Corollary 2 Suppose that Assumptions A and B’ hold, and let dze denote the largest integer
that is below z. The optimal mechanism for n agents is a generalized median scheme with
(n− 1) phantom voters’ peaks distributed according to
l∗k =

⌈
n x
2−c(x2)
C(x2)−c(x2)
⌉
if k = 1⌈
n x
k+1−c(xk+1)
C(xk+1)−c(xk+1)
⌉
−
⌈
n x
k−c(xk)
C(xk)−c(xk)
⌉
if 1 < k < K
n− 1−∑K−1m=1 l∗m if k = K
.
This corollary yields immediate and intuitive comparative statics with respect to param-
eters of the linear utility function {ak, bk}Kk=1. By the definition of the cutoffs xk, increases
in either ak or bk decrease xk and increase xk+1, which in turn increase lk. That is, if the
attractiveness of any alternative increases, the optimal number of the phantom voters with
peaks on this alternative increases as well.
Example 4 Suppose that the distribution of signals F is uniform on [0, 1]. Then C(x) =
E[X|X > x] = (1 + x) /2 and c(x) = E[X|X ≤ x] = x/2. Therefore, the optimal distribution
of phantom voters’ peaks is given by: l∗k =
⌈
nxk+1
⌉− ⌈nxk⌉. Intuitively, here the number of
phantom voters’ peaks is proportional to the share of real types whose top alternative is k.
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We can also further illustrate the above corollary by describing in more detail the optimal
voting rules when there are two agents. If there are two agents (i and −i) and K alternatives,
the set of peaks-only, onto, DIC and anonymous mechanisms contains exactly K generalized
median voter schemes with one phantom voter (see Theorem 1). Therefore, we only need to
find the optimal position for the one additional phantom voter.
Corollary 3 Suppose there are only two agents. Under Assumptions A and B’, the optimal
mechanism is a generalized median voter scheme with one phantom voter whose peak is placed
on
k∗ ≡ min
{
k ∈ K : xk+1 ≥ 1
2
[
C
(
xk+1
)
+ c
(
xk+1
)] }
.
Note that the condition for determining the optimal phantom voter peak can be rewritten
as k∗ = k if x∗ ∈ [xk, xk+1], where x∗ = 12 [C (x∗) + c (x∗)]. The critical value x∗ has
the same distance to the upper conditional mean C (x∗) as to the lower conditional mean
c (x∗). In particular, if the distribution is symmetric, then x∗ coincides with the mean of the
distribution.
5.3 Other Objective Functions
Other, non-utilitarian, objective functions can be considered as well. For example, if the
designer’s preferences are maximin, then the desired allocation is
gmin (x1, ..., xn) = km
where km satisfies xm ∈ (xkm , xkm+1] with xm = min {x1, ..., xn}. That is, km is the most
preferred alternative of the agent with the lowest signal. This rule is implementable through
a peaks-only mechanism
pimin (k1, ..., kn) = min {k1, ..., kn} .
In such a case, all phantoms should be allocated on alternative 1.
Similarly, if the designer’s preferences are maximax, then the designer would like to im-
plement allocation
gmax (x1, ..., xn) = kM
where kM satisfies xM ∈ (xkM , xkM+1] with xM = max {x1, ..., xn}. That is, kM is the most
preferred alternative of the agent with the highest signal, and this rule is also implementable
through a peaks-only mechanism
pimax (k1, ..., kn) = max {k1, ..., kn} .
In such a case, all phantoms should be allocated on alternative K.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We have characterized constrained efficient (i.e., second-best) dominant strategy incentive
compatible and deterministic mechanisms in a setting where privately informed agents have
single-crossing utility functions, but where monetary transfers are not feasible. Our approach
allows a systematic choice among Pareto-efficient mechanisms based on the ex-ante utility
they generate.
In the standard setting with independent types, linear utility and monetary transfers, an
equivalence result between dominant strategy incentive compatible and Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible mechanisms has been established by Gershkov et al. [2013]. Dominant strategy
mechanisms are robust to variations in beliefs. It is an open question whether using the
more permissible Bayesian incentive compatibility concept can improve the performance of
constrained efficient mechanisms also in settings without monetary transfers.
7 Appendix A: Proofs
In the proof of Lemma 1, we will use the following definition and a proposition due to Saporiti
[2009].
Definition 2 A mechanism pi is tops-only if it has the form pi : Kn → K. We say that a DIC
mechanism g is equivalent to a tops-only mechanism pi if
g (x1, ..., xn) = pi (k1, ..., kn) ,
for any type profile (x1, ..., xn) and for any alternative profile (k1, ..., kn) such that xi ∈
(xki , xki+1] for all i
Proposition 1 (Saporiti 2009) A mechanism g is DIC only if it is equivalent to a tops-
only mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 1. We first show that every onto and DIC mechanism satisfies una-
nimity. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose there exist an alternative k and a report
profile (x̂1, ..., x̂n) such that x̂i ∈
(
xk, xk+1
)
for all i but g (x̂1, ..., x̂n) = l with l 6= k. Since
the mechanism is onto, there exists some type profile (x∗1, ..., x∗n) such that g (x∗1, ..., x∗n) = k.
First suppose x∗i ∈
(
xk, xk+1
)
for all i. Consider agent 1 and fix the other agents’ reports
at (x∗2, ..., x∗n). DIC implies that g (x̂1, x∗2, ..., x∗n) = k, otherwise agent 1 could manipulate
at (x̂1, x∗2..., x∗n) via x∗1 to achieve his best alternative k. Next consider agent 2, and fix the
other agents’ reports at (x̂1, x∗3, ..., x∗n) . Then, again we must have g (x̂1, x̂2, x∗3, ..., x∗n) = k,
otherwise agent 2 could manipulate at (x̂1, x̂2, x∗3, ..., x∗n) via x∗2. Applying the same argu-
ment to the remaining agents, 3, ..., n, we obtain that g (x̂1, ..., x̂n) = k, which is a con-
tradiction. Therefore, there must exist at least one agent i such that x∗i /∈
(
xk, xk+1
)
and
g (x∗1, ..., x∗∗i , ..., x
∗
n) = m with m 6= k and x∗∗i ∈
(
xk, xk+1
)
. Fix the reports of all agents but
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i to
(
x∗1, ..., x∗i−1, x
∗
i+1, ..., x
∗
n
)
. This mechanism is not incentive compatible, because agent i
with type x∗∗i could manipulate at
(
x∗1, ..., x∗i−1, x
∗∗
i , x
∗
i+1, ..., x
∗
n
)
via x∗i and achieve his best
alternative k.
We now show that every onto and DIC mechanism is Pareto efficient. Due to the last
Proposition, it is sufficient to prove the statement for tops-only mechanisms. Consider any
deterministic DIC and onto mechanism pi (k1, ..., kn) where k1, ..., kn are the reported peaks.
The Pareto set given peaks (k1, ..., kn) is
{k ∈ K : min (k1, ..., kn) ≤ k ≤ max (k1, ..., kn)} .
Consider any profile of peaks
(
k̂1, ..., k̂n
)
. In order to show that pi is Pareto efficient, it is
sufficient to show that,
min
(
k̂1, ..., k̂n
)
≤ pi
(
k̂1, ..., k̂n
)
≤ max
(
k̂1, ..., k̂n
)
.
We prove the above by contradiction. First assume that pi
(
k̂1, ..., k̂n
)
> k ≡ max
(
k̂1, ..., k̂n
)
.
Since the mechanism is onto, there exists a profile (k∗1, ...., k∗n) such that
pi (k∗1, ...., k
∗
n) = k.
Consider agent 1, and fix the types of other agents at k̂−1 =
(
k̂2, ..., k̂n
)
. Then DIC for
agent 1 with type k̂1 implies that, for all k1, pi
(
k1, k̂2, ..., k̂n
)
> k. Now fix agent 1’s type
at k∗1, and consider agent 2. Since pi
(
k∗1, k̂2, k̂3, ..., k̂n
)
> k, DIC for agent 2 with type k̂2
implies that, for all k2, pi
(
k∗1, k2, k̂3, .., k̂n
)
> k. Now we fix agent 1 and 2’s types at k∗1, k∗2,
respectively. We can proceed as before and consider agent 3. We can argue that for all k3,
we have pi
(
k∗1, k∗2, k3, k̂4, .., k̂n
)
> k. Therefore for all kn, we have pi
(
k∗1, .., k∗n−1, kn
)
> k. But
this contradicts the fact that pi
(
k∗i , k
∗
−i
)
= k.
The proof of pi
(
k̂1, ..., k̂n
)
≥ min
(
k̂1, ..., k̂n
)
is similar. Therefore, any deterministic DIC
and onto mechanism must be Pareto efficient.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let k ≥ 2, and suppose that lk > 0 is part of the optimal allocation of
(n− 1) phantoms. By optimality, the social planner must prefer this allocation of phantoms
over allocating lk − 1 phantoms on alternative k and lk−1 + 1 phantoms on alternative k− 1.
This change matters only if it affects the median among n − 1 phantom and n real voters.
For this to happen, it must be that the total number of voters (“real” and “phantom”) with
values below xk is (n− 1): there are exactly
(
n− 1−∑k−1m=1 lm) “real” voters with values
below xk and
(∑k−1
m=1 lm + 1
)
“real” voters with values above xk. In this case, by moving a
phantom from alternative k to alternative k − 1, the planner changes the median from k to
k − 1. In this case, the total expected utility from alternative k is given by(
n− 1−
k−1∑
m=1
lm
)
ukx<xk +
(
k−1∑
m=1
lm + 1
)
ukx>xk .
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The total expected utility from alternative k − 1 is given by(
n− 1−
k−1∑
m=1
lm
)
uk−1
x<xk
+
(
k−1∑
m=1
lm + 1
)
uk−1
x>xk
.
Since the planner (weakly) prefers k to k − 1, the total expected utility from alternative k
must be higher than the total expected utility from alternative k − 1. This gives us the
following “first-order condition” for all k ≥ 2 with lk > 0:(
n− 1−
k−1∑
m=1
lm
)(
ukx<xk − uk−1x<xk
)
+
(
k−1∑
m=1
lm + 1
)(
ukx>xk − uk−1x>xk
)
≥ 0 (11)
Similarly, if lk > 0 with k ≤ K − 1 is part of the optimal allocation of (n− 1) phantoms,
then the social planner must prefer this allocation of phantoms to allocating lk− 1 phantoms
on alternative k and lk+1 + 1 phantoms on alternative k + 1. This change matters only if it
affects the median among n − 1 phantom and n real voters. For this to happen, it must be
that the total number of voters (“real” and “phantom”) with values below xk+1 is n. In other
words, there are exactly
(
n−∑km=1 lm) “real” voters with values below xk+1 and ∑k−1m=1 lm
“real” voters with values above xk+1. In this case, the total expected utility from alternative
k is given by (
n−
k∑
m=1
lm
)
ukx<xk+1 +
(
k∑
m=1
lm
)
ukx>xk+1 .
The total expected utility from alternative k − 1 is given by(
n−
k∑
m=1
lm
)
uk+1
x<xk+1
+
(
k∑
m=1
lm
)
uk+1
x>xk+1
.
This yields another “first-order condition” for all k ≤ K − 1 with lk > 0:(
n−
k∑
m=1
lm
)(
ukx<xk+1 − uk+1x<xk+1
)
+
(
k∑
m=1
lm
)(
ukx>xk+1 − uk+1x>xk+1
)
≥ 0. (12)
These two first-order conditions can be rewritten as bounds on phantom distributions for
alternatives k with lk > 0. These were inequalities (9) and (10) from the main text, which
we reproduce below:
k−1∑
m=1
lm ≥
n
(
uk−1
x<xk
− uk
x<xk
)
(
uk−1
x<xk
− uk
x<xk
)
+
(
uk
x>xk
− uk−1
x>xk
) − 1 = γ (k)− 1, for all k ≥ 2,
k∑
m=1
lm ≤
n
(
uk
x<xk+1
− uk+1
x<xk+1
)
(
uk
x<xk+1
− uk+1
x<xk+1
)
+
(
uk+1
x>xk+1
− uk
x>xk+1
) = γ (k + 1) , for all k ≤ K − 1.
Lemma 2 below shows that the above two conditions hold for alternative k with lk = 0.
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Therefore, we can construct the (unique) candidate distribution of phantom voters’ peaks
as follows. We first derive bounds for l∗1 by taking k = 2 in (9) and k = 1 in (10):
nγ (2)− 1 ≤ l∗1 ≤ nγ (2) .
Since the two bounds differ by 1 and l∗1 must be an integer, l∗1 is generically unique and must
be equal to dnγ (2)e ,where dze denotes the largest integer that is below z.
Next note that, for all 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, conditions (9) and (10) imply that
nγ (k + 1)− 1 ≤
k−1∑
m=1
l∗m ≤ nγ (k + 1) .
Hence,
∑k
m=1 l
∗
m is also generically unique and must be equal to dnγ (k + 1)e .As a result, we
can deduce l∗2 as
l∗2 =
2∑
m=1
l∗m − l∗1 = dnγ (3)e − dnγ (2)e .
Similarly, we can obtain recursively for all l∗k with 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 :
l∗k = dnγ (k + 1)e − dnγ (k)e .
Since by Assumption B, γ (k) is increasing in k. Hence, we obtain that l∗k ≥ 0.
Finally, since there are (n− 1) phantom voters in total, we have
l∗K = n− 1−
K−1∑
m=1
l∗m = n− 1− dnγ (K)e .
It is clear that γ (K) < 1, so l∗K ≥ 0.
To complete the proof, we need to argue that the phantom distribution we constructed
above is indeed optimal. Note that we are optimizing a bounded function over a discrete
domain, so that the optimal solution always exists. Because the optimal solution has to satisfy
the two necessary conditions (9) and (10), and because there is essentially unique distribution
that satisfies these two conditions, our candidate distribution {l∗k} must be optimal.
Lemma 2 The bounds (9) and (10) hold for all k ∈ K with lk = 0.
Proof. First let us define κ1 and κ2 as follows:
κ1 = max {m ∈ K : lk = 0 for all k ≤ m} ,
κ2 = min {m ∈ K : lk = 0 for all k ≥ m} .
We need to consider several cases.
Case 1: Both κ1 and κ2 exist. Then we have l1 = ... = lκ1 = 0, and lκ2 = ... = lK = 0.
An alternative k with lk = 0 could belong to one of the following three possible scenarios:
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(i) k ≤ κ1. Since l1 = ... = lκ1 = 0, condition (10) holds trivially and we only need to
prove condition (9). By definition of κ1, lκ1+1 > 0. Thus, (9) must hold at κ1 + 1:
κ1∑
m=1
lm ≥ nγ (κ1 + 1)− 1.
Since l1 = ... = lκ1 = 0, we have
k−1∑
m=1
lm =
κ1∑
m=1
lm ≥ nγ (κ1 + 1)− 1 ≥ nγ (k)− 1,
where the second inequality follows because γ is increasing and κ1 + 1 > k.
(ii) k ≥ κ2. Since lκ2 = ... = lK = 0, for all k ≥ κ2, we have
k−1∑
m=1
lm = n− 1−
K∑
k
lm = n− 1.
Hence, condition (9) is trivially satisfied, and we only need to prove condition (10). By
definition of κ2, lκ2−1 > 0. So we have (10) hold at κ2 − 1:
κ2−1∑
m=1
lm ≤ nγ (κ2) .
Therefore,
k∑
m=1
lm = n− 1 =
κ2−1∑
m=1
lm ≤ nγ (κ2) ≤ nγ (k + 1) .
Again the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of γ (·) and the fact that κ2 < k+ 1.
(iii) k ∈ (κ1, κ2). Define k1 and k2 as follows:
k1 = max {m ∈ K : m < k and lm > 0} ,
k2 = min {m ∈ K : m > k and lm > 0} .
Both k1 and k2 are well defined for all k ∈ (κ1, κ2). By definition of k1 and k2, we have
k∑
m=1
lm =
k1∑
m=1
lm and
k−1∑
m=1
lm =
k2−1∑
m=1
lm,
and condition (9) holds at k2 − 1 and (10) holds at k1 :
k2−1∑
m=1
lm ≥ nγ (k2)− 1, and
k1∑
m=1
lm ≤ nγ (k1 + 1) .
Since γ (·) is increasing and k1 < k < k2, we have
k−1∑
m=1
lm ≥ nγ (k)− 1, and
k∑
m=1
lm ≤ nγ (k + 1) .
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Case 2: Neither κ1 nor κ2 exists. Then the argument of Case 1(iii) applies for all k with
lk = 0.
Case 3: κ1 exists but κ2 does not. Consider alternative k with lk = 0. If k ≤ κ1, the
argument of Case 1(i) applies. If k > κ1, the argument of Case 1 (iii) applies.
Case 4: κ2 exists but κ1 does not. Consider alternative k with lk = 0. If k ≥ κ2, the
argument of Case 1(ii) applies. If k < κ2, the argument of Case 1(iii) applies.
Proof of Theorem 3. In the first-best rule the designer chooses alternative k if and only
if it maximizes the sum of agents’ expected utilities, that is, for any l ∈ K = {1, ...,K}
n∑
i=1
uk(xi) ≥
n∑
i=1
ul(xi)⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
1
n
uk(xi) ≥
n∑
i=1
1
n
ul(xi).
Let now n go to infinity. Using the law of large numbers, the last inequality becomes
∀l,
∫ 1
0
uk(x)f(x)dx ≥
∫ 1
0
ul(x)f(x)dx⇐⇒
∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− ul(x)) f(x)dx ≥ 0.
Claim: Under Assumptions A and B, an alternative k maximizes the expected social wel-
fare, k ∈ maxl∈K
∫ 1
0 ul(x)f(x)dx, if and only if the following two “local” first-order conditions
holds: ∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− uk−1(x)) f(x)dx ≥ 0 (13)∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− uk+1(x)) f(x)dx ≥ 0 (14)
The necessity is obvious. To show sufficiency, we first prove that if condition (14) holds,
then any upward deviation is not profitable: for all l > k,∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− ul(x)) f(x)dx ≥ 0.
We first notice that∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− uk+1(x)) f(x)dx
=
∫ xk+1
0
(uk(x)− uk+1(x)) f(x)dx+
∫ 1
xk+1
(uk(x)− uk+1(x)) f(x)dx
= F
(
xk+1
)(
ukx<xk+1 − uk+1x<xk+1
)
+
(
1− F
(
xk+1
))(
ukx>xk+1 − uk+1x>xk+1
)
.
Therefore, condition (14) is equivalent to
Γ (k + 1) =
uk
x<xk+1
− uk+1
x<xk+1
uk+1
x>xk+1
− uk
x>xk+1
≥ 1− F
(
xk+1
)
F (xk+1)
.
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By definition of cutoffs and Assumption B, xk+2 > xk+1 and Γ (k + 1) ≤ Γ (k + 2). Therefore,
condition (14) implies
uk+1
x<xk+2
− uk+2
x<xk+2
uk+2
x>xk+2
− uk+1
x>xk+2
≥ u
k
x<xk+1
− uk+1
x<xk+1
uk+1
x>xk+1
− uk
x>xk+1
≥ 1− F
(
xk+1
)
F (xk+1)
≥ 1− F
(
xk+2
)
F (xk+2)
which in turn implies
F
(
xk+2
)(
uk+1
x<xk+2
− uk+2
x<xk+2
)
+
(
1− F
(
xk+2
))(
uk+1
x>xk+2
− uk+2
x>xk+2
)
≥ 0.
The last inequality can be rewritten as∫ 1
0
(uk+1(x)− uk+2(x)) f(x)dx ≥ 0.
By applying the above logic recursively, we have proved that (14) implies, for all k < l ≤ K,∫ 1
0
(ul(x)− ul+1(x)) f(x)dx ≥ 0. (15)
Next we note that, if condition (14) holds, then for all k < l ≤ K,∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− ul(x)) f(x)dx
=
∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− uk+1(x) + uk+1(x)− ...− ul−1(x) + ul−1(x)− ul(x)) f(x)dx
=
∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− uk+1(x)) f(x)dx+
∫ 1
0
(uk+1(x)− uk+2(x)) f(x)dx
+...+
∫ 1
0
(ul−1(x)− ul(x)) f(x)dx
≥ 0
The last inequality follows because each integral is positive by using (15) repeatedly.
We can follow an analogous procedure to show that if condition (13) holds, then any
downward deviation is not profitable: for all 1 ≤ l < k,∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− ul(x)) f(x)dx ≥ 0.
This concludes the proof of the above Claim.
It follows from the above Claim that the first-best, welfare maximizing alternative is the
lowest alternative k for which∫ 1
0
(uk(x)− uk+1(x)) f(x)dx ≥ 0⇐⇒
uk
x<xk+1
− uk+1
x<xk+1
uk+1
x>xk+1
− uk
x>xk+1
≥ 1− F
(
xk+1
)
F (xk+1)
In the optimal DIC mechanism (second-best) alternative k is chosen if it is the lowest alter-
native such that the number of voters (both real and phantom) with peaks on alternatives
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below k is at least n (recall that the total number of voters, real and phantom, is 2n− 1). In
the limit where n goes to infinity alternative k is chosen if it is the lowest alternative such
that
uk
x<xk+1
− uk+1
x<xk+1
uk+1
x>xk+1
− uk
x>xk+1
+ uk
x<xk+1
− uk+1
x<xk+1
+F
(
xk+1
)
≥ 1⇐⇒ u
k
x<xk+1
− uk+1
x<xk+1
uk+1
x>xk+1
− uk
x>xk+1
≥ 1− F
(
xk+1
)
F (xk+1)
Thus, we obtain the same rule as in the first-best mechanism, as desired.
Proof of Corollary 3. Recall that the candidate position k∗ is defined as
k∗ ≡ min
{
k ∈ K : xk+1 ≥ (C(xk+1) + c(xk+1))/2
}
.
By definition of k∗
xk+1 ≥ (c
(
xk+1
)
+ C
(
xk+1
)
)/2 for all k ≥ k∗,
and
xk+1 < (c
(
xk+1
)
+ C
(
xk+1
)
)/2 for all k < k∗.
This implies that
xk+1 − c(xk+1)
C(xk+1)− c(xk+1) ≥ 1/2, for all k ≥ k
∗, (16)
and
xk+1 − c(xk+1)
C(xk+1)− c(xk+1) < 1/2 for all k < k
∗. (17)
Moreover we note that for all k
xk+1 − c(xk+1)
C(xk+1)− c(xk+1) < 1.
Therefore, in order to satisfy both (16) and (17), we must have, in the optimal phantom
distribution, l∗k∗ = 1, and l
∗
k = 0 for all k 6= k∗.
8 Appendix B: Sufficient Conditions for Assumption B and
Assumption B’
To derive sufficient conditions for Assumption B, we first introduce several well known defi-
nitions of stochastic orders (see Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007]).
Definition 3 (i) A random variable Y dominates a random variable X in the usual stochas-
tic order (or first-order stochastic dominance, denoted by X ≤st Y ) if Pr {X > x} ≤
Pr {Y > x} for all x.
(ii) A random variable Y dominates a random variable X in the hazard rate order (denoted
as X ≤hr Y ) if [X|X > x] ≤st [Y |Y > x] for all x.
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(iii) A random variable Y dominates a random variable X in the reverse hazard rate order
(denoted as X ≤rh Y ) if [X|X < x] ≤st [Y |Y < x] for all x.
(iv) A random variable Y dominates a random variable X in the likelihood ratio order
(denoted as X ≤lr Y ) if [X|a ≤ X ≤ b] ≤st [Y |a ≤ Y ≤ b] for all a < b.
It is clear from the above definitions that X ≤lr Y implies both X ≤hr Y and X ≤rh
Y . We now let hk (x) denote the utility difference for a type-x agent from two adjacent
alternatives k and k − 1:
hk(x) = uk−1 (x)− uk (x) .
We claim that if the random variables {hk (x)}k∈K are ordered in terms of both hazard rate
order and reverse hazard rate order, that is, hk ≤hr hk+1 and hk ≤rh hk+1, then Assumption
B holds.14 To see this, note that we can write
uk−1
x<xk
− ukx<xk = E[hk(x) | x < xk] = E[hk(x) | hk(x) > 0]
where the second equality follows from the definition of cutoff xk and the single-crossing
property. By rewriting uk
x>xk
− uk−1
x>xk
analogously, we obtain
Γ (k) = −E[hk(x) | hk(x) > 0]
E[hk(x) | hk(x) < 0] .
Note that hk ≤hr hk+1 implies that E[hk(x) | hk(x) > 0] is increasing in k, and hk ≤rh hk+1
implies that E[hk(x) | hk(x) < 0] is increasing in k. Therefore, Γ (k) is increasing in k.
To derive sufficient conditions for Assumption B’ to hold in the linear case, let us first
recall a well-known concept used in the theory of reliability.
Definition 4 (i) The mean residual life (MRL) of a random variable X ∈ [0, θ] is defined
as
MRL (x) =
{
E [X − x|X ≥ x] if x < θ
0 if x = θ
(ii) A random variable X satisfies the decreasing mean residual life (DMRL) property if the
function MRL (x) is decreasing in x.
If we let X denote the life-time of a component, then MRL (x) measures the expected
remaining life of a component that has survived until time x.15 Assuming that x − C(x) is
14Note that conditions hk ≤hr hk+1 and hk ≤rh hk+1 impose restrictions on the shapes of both the distri-
bution F and the utility function u. Alternatively, if we assume F is uniform, we could explicitly derive the
required conditions for Assumption B only on function u. On the other hand, if we assume that the utility
function u is linear as in our linear case that will be investigated below, we can derive the required conditions
for Assumption B only on the distribution F .
15The MRL function is related to the hazard rate (or failure rate) λ (x) = f (x) / [1− F (x)]. The “increasing
failure rate” (IFR) assumption is commonly made in the economics literature. DMRL is a weaker property,
and it is implied by IFR.
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increasing is equivalent to assuming a decreasing mean residual life (DMRL). Assuming that
x− c(x) is increasing is equivalent to assuming log-concavity of ∫ x0 F (s) ds, because
x− c(x) =
∫ x
0 F (s) ds
F (x)
and
F (x)∫ x
0 F (s) ds
=
d
dx
log
[∫ x
0
F (s) ds
]
A sufficient condition for
∫ x
0 F (s) ds to be log-concave is that F (x) is log-concave. A sufficient
condition for both log-concavity of F and DMRL of F is that the density f is log-concave.16
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